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Not all Crises are Detrimental for the Government.
The Global Economic Crisis and the Swedish Case
Patrik Öhberg *
Abstract: »Nicht alle Krisen wirken sich negativ auf das Ansehen der Regierung
aus. Die globale Wirtschaftskrise und der Fall Schweden«. Not all crises have the
same impact. In this article the argument is made that we should make a dis-
tinction between a “homemade” and an “externally” caused crisis when analyz-
ing the implications of an economic downturn. The case is Sweden and the
analyses include both citizens’ and MPs’ attitudes towards democracy before
and after the economic crisis of 2008. The article also makes an effort to com-
pare the economic crisis of 2008 to a previous economic crisis that occurred at
the beginning of the 1990s. Both crises were related to international turmoil,
and they had a clearly negative impact on the Swedish economy. Yet, the crises
were also very different. In the crisis of the 1990s, Sweden was seen as one of
the countries that suffered the most, while in the aftermath of the economic
crisis 2008, Sweden was seen as one of the most successful countries in han-
dling the crisis. By comparing the two crises, we can get a better understanding
of the extent to which attribution of responsibility depends on the context of
the crisis.
Keywords: Economic crises, electoral behavior, attribution of responsibility po-
litical trust, governments.
1.  Introduction
When the 2008 economic crisis struck the world, the open and export-
dependent Sweden was shaken. Real GDP fell by more than 5%. This drop was
even larger than during the devastating economic crisis that left the country in
political turmoil in 1991 (Bergman 2011). With such an economic downturn,
any economic theory would expect that the approval ratings of the government
would take a drastic dip as well. Moreover, economic crises might also affect
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993). Yet,
this article tells another story: A story about a crisis that left the government
stronger and even more popular than before. The Swedish center-right govern-
ment, The Alliance for Sweden, was reelected in 2010, and the Prime Minis-
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ter’s party achieved its best election result in modern times. Moreover, support
for democratic values was stable and the confidence in political parties in-
creased by ten percentage points, while confidence in the government im-
proved by 18 percentage points. Given the historical dimension of the crisis,
these results are surprising and ask for an explanation.
In this article, the argument is made that we should make a distinction be-
tween a “homemade” and an “externally” caused crisis when analyzing the
implications of an economic downturn. The article includes analyses of both
citizens and MPs before and after the economic crisis of 2008. It also makes an
effort to compare the economic crisis of 2008 to the economic crisis that oc-
curred at the beginning of the 1990s. Both crises were related to international
turmoil, and they had a clearly negative impact on the Swedish economy. Yet,
the crises were also very different. In the crisis of the 1990s, Sweden was seen
as one of the countries that suffered the most, while in the aftermath of the
economic crisis 2008, Sweden was seen as one of the most successful countries
in handling the crisis. By comparing the two crises, we can get a better under-
standing of the extent to which attribution of responsibility depends on the
context of the crisis.
2. Who to Blame?
A fundamental ingredient of a functioning representative democracy is that
citizens have the right to reward or punish political leaders in elections. The
idea is straightforward: Governments, political parties and politicians should be
held accountable for things they have done or things they have failed to do. But
even if the idea of accountability is clear, the actual attribution of accountabil-
ity is frequently not easy for the voters. Electoral researchers have sometimes
even called into question whether voters know which parties and politicians are
actually responsible for policy decisions (Achen and Bartels 2016). Moreover,
some studies have shown that voters even tend to punish incumbents for things
that are beyond their control, such as the outcome of sports events (Healy,
Malhotra and Mo 2010) or shark attacks (Bartels 2008).
The large literature on economic voting convincingly argues that voters’
support for the government varies systematically with macro-economic fluctua-
tions. When the economy is doing poorly, governments frequently lose elec-
tions. And when it is doing fine, voters are inclined to support the incumbents
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). It is especially voters’ evaluations of the
economy that seem to matter rather than the actual macro-economic situation.
When voters worry about the economy, incumbents should be concerned about
their electoral prospects. Yet, institutions matter for the clarity of responsibility
and thereby for voters’ ability to hold governments accountable. The relation-
ship between the economy and the electoral success of the government is
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stronger where responsibility is clearly attributable (Powell and Whitten 1993).
Therefore, majority governments are easier to blame than weak minority gov-
ernments that are constantly required to find compromises with the opposition.
3. Easy to Blame - Sweden had a Majority Government in
2008
In 2008, Sweden had a center-right majority government consisting of four
parties; the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats, The Liberals and the Cen-
ter Party. Together, these four parties had formed what they called “The Alli-
ance for Sweden”. The formation of this “Alliansen” is worth telling. In August
2004, an outdoor hot tub, located in the small community of Högfors in north-
ern Sweden, was used to make political history. It was the party leader of the
Center Party, Maud Olofsson, who hosted the event. Together with the leaders
of the other three parties, she declared the formation of the coalition. The hot
tub was chosen to demonstrate to the participating journalists that the leaders of
the four parties now liked each other so much that they even socialized private-
ly (and rather intimately).
The purpose of forming the Alliance for Sweden was to “finally” put an end
to the long dominance of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden. At the time,
the Social Democrats had governed for 52 of the last 59 years, mostly by form-
ing single-party minority governments. Even though the event with the bathing
party leaders is highly exaggerated – the pictures show the party leaders stand-
ing in front of the tub rather than sitting in it –, it was not an exaggeration to
call the presentation of the Alliance for Sweden a historical event. In 2006, the
Alliance for Sweden received a clear majority of the seats in the parliament,
and placed a surprised Social Democratic party on the opposition benches
(Aylott and Bohlin 2007).
One important part of the election campaign of 2006 was the presentation of
a joint election manifesto. The four parties of the Alliance had managed to
present a coherent election program before the beginning of the electoral cam-
paign, which was the first in Swedish history. The manifesto was a result of the
four parties’ conclusion that the Social Democrats had to be defeated in the
field in which they had their highest reputation, namely their ability to form
stable governments. The earlier center-right governments of 1976 to 1978,
1979 to 1981 and 1991 to 1994 had been weak and ridden by conflicts between
the coalition parties. The four center-right parties needed to convince voters
that they could provide Sweden with a respectable and stable alternative to the
Social Democrats. In their manifesto, the four parties jointly made specific
promises for policy areas that had historically divided them, and they hoped to
convey their determination to deliver. The manifesto was long and detailed. It
included more than 200 electoral promises on central issues, of which a large
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majority were realized after coming to power, despite the economic crisis
(Naurin 2014; Naurin et al. forthcoming; Thomson et al. 2017).
Taken together, the Alliance for Sweden managed to achieve what it had
aimed for: A government that appeared, and indeed was, stable and efficient. In
terms of clarity of responsibility, the Swedish voters knew to whom to attribute
credit and blame.
4. When the Economic Crisis Reached Sweden in 2008
Sweden has a small and very open economy (Bryant, Henderson and Becker
2012) that is heavily dependent on the world market. Almost half (44 percent)
of the Swedish GDP is related to export. Therefore, the onset of the turmoil in
the global financial markets had immediate consequences for the Swedish
economy. The GDP decline in 2008 was the worst since the economic crisis of
the 1990s. Unemployment increased from 6.1% in 2007 to 8.6% in 2010. Even
though the long-term effects of the crisis on the Swedish economy were mod-
est, the unemployment rate is still higher in 2018 than it was before the crisis.
Since Swedish companies are so dependent on exports, it was the private indus-
trial sector that suffered the most from the downturn in the global markets.
Especially the automotive industry was affected. A symbolic episode was when
General Motor declared in 2009 that the former Swedish car company Saab
was not a prioritized part of their production anymore. As a consequence, thou-
sands of workers in Sweden were laid off and a well-known and popular Swe-
dish brand disappeared.
What did the government do to handle the crisis? Does it deserve praise?
Well, to begin with, the economy was in good shape when the crisis hit the
country. Sovereign debt was low, just as the unemployment rate. Several im-
portant decisions were made during the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis,
the government’s first reaction was to raise the state’s deposit insurance to
protect customers’ money in the banks. This was done in order to send a signal
to the markets and to the customers that the state was able and willing to pro-
tect the citizens’ savings. Later on, the government introduced a plan to stabi-
lize the financial system by ensuring that banks and financial institutions would
be bailed out by the government to avoid serious disturbances of the financial
system. The government also presented a stimulus program for the job market.
This included investments into the infrastructure, more funding to the Em-
ployment Agency, tax reductions for households who invested in renovating
their homes, and a number of additional government programs (Regering-
skansliet 2008). Already by the end of 2009, the worst of the crisis was over-
come and an economic recovery set in.
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5.  Voters’ Attribution of Accountability
As stated earlier, it is foremost voters’ economic evaluations that matter for
attributing responsibility. One of the reasons Swedish citizens did not blame
the government could be that they did not really feel the crisis. Yet, Table 1
shows that in 2007 only 12 percent of the respondents stated that the country’s
economic situation had gotten worse during the past twelve months. A year
later, that share had quadrupled – to 53 percent. And by 2009, even 76 percent
of the respondents claimed that the country suffered from economic problems.
Thus, there is no doubt that Swedish citizens were aware of the crisis.
Table 1: Share of Citizens Claiming that the Economic Situation of Sweden
has Deteriorated During the past 12 Months (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Economic situation has
deteriorated 12 53 76 20
Source: Society, Opinion and Media (SOM) Institute Surveys 1988-2011.
Even though the Swedish citizens saw and felt the slowdown in economic
growth, they did not start questioning the democratic political institutions. In
the analyses below, the support for the Swedish democratic system was meas-
ured at four different levels of generality, from specific (political parties) to
general (idea of democracy):
- Confidence in the political parties
- Confidence in the national government
- Support for the Swedish democratic regime
- Support for democracy as an ideal system of government.
The analyses are based on the data of the Swedish World Values Surveys 2006
and 20111.
In Table 2 we can detect that the general pattern of support of democracy is
solid. More than 95 percent of the respondents expressed support of democracy
as an ideal system of government at both points in time (T1: 98%, T2: 96%).
This level of support is very high and there is very little change over time (-2
percentage points). Swedish citizens are also rather satisfied with the way de-
mocracy works in their country. The belief that the country is governed demo-
cratically scores around 85 percent, and not much has changed between the
2006 and 2011. Thus, the crisis did not change the basic foundation of the
democratic system in Sweden.
1  Data available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>.
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Table 2: Support for Democracy Among Citizens (%)
2006 2011 Difference
Support for the idea of democracy
Support for the democratic system of
government in Sweden
Confidence in the government
Confidence in political parties
98
86
43
33
96
84
61
43
-2
-2
18***
10**
Source: World Values Surveys 2005 and 2011.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Indicators used for analysis:
Support for the idea of democracy (“Having a democratic system”): Response options: 1 – Very
good, 2 – Fairly good, 3 – Fairly bad, and 4 – Very bad. “Very good” and “fairly good” were
coded as 1, “fairly bad” and “very bad” as 0.
Evaluation of the democraticness of the Swedish system of government: 1 ‘not at all demo-
cratic’ to 10 ‘completely democratic’. Scores from 1 to 5 were coded as 0 and scores from 6 to
10 as 1.
Confidence in government and in political parties: “A great deal of confidence” and “quite a
lot of confidence” coded as 1, “not much confidence” and “no confidence at all” as 0.
If we instead look at how Swedish citizens reacted towards the actors at the
process level (the government and the political parties), we can notice some
attitudinal changes. The approval ratings for both the government and the polit-
ical parties were stronger after the crisis than they had been before. Support for
government increased by 18 percentage points and at the same time confidence
in the political parties rose from 33 percent to 43 percent.
Between the first and the second survey Sweden experienced a change in
government in 2006. The approval ratings might therefore be an effect of
change from an unpopular government to a more popular one. Yet, that is not
the case. By using more or less the same survey question, asked by Society,
Opinion and Media Institute (SOM), we are able to follow the approval ratings
of the new government in more detail. In 2007, 33 percent of the citizens
thought that the government did a rather/very good job, in 2008 it was 35 per-
cent, in 2009 47 percent and in 2010 the approval ratings had climbed to 59
percent. Therefore, increased confidence ratings for the government in Table 2
cannot be explained by the change in government.
To further support the interpretation that the crisis had a positive effect at
the process level, we can study the evolution of citizens’ trust in politicians.
Since 1988, after the national elections, citizens have been asked how much
they trust Swedish politicians. Figure 1 includes the share of voters who had
indicated a very or rather high trust in Swedish politicians between 1988 and
2010. It shows that Swedish citizens’ trust in their politicians varies quite a bit.
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, a striking record share (59 percent) of
the Swedish citizens expressed such trust. In fact, the highest result among the
seven surveys is found in 2010. Political analysts noted, furthermore, that turn-
out increased during the period as well, from 82 percent in 2006 to 85 percent
in 2010 (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016). The empirical evidence confirms that
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the economic crisis did indeed have a negative impact on the Swedish economy
and that the citizens were aware of the crisis. At the same time, however, con-
fidence in the government and the political parties increased.
Figure 1: Share of Swedish Voters Expressing Very or Rather High Trust in
Politicians (%)
Source: Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016.
6.   Are Citizens Satisfied because Political Elites Are?
One of the reasons why citizens were rather satisfied with the political system
might be due to a consensus among the political elites who gave them cues
about how well Sweden handled the situation (Brody 1991; Carmines and
Stimson 1989; Zaller 1992). In order to find out if an elite consensus had an
impact on the evaluations of the citizens, we analyzed the differences between
the MPs of the parties in governmental and of the opposition parties. When the
Swedish parliamentarians were asked about their support for the idea of de-
mocracy as a universal value and their evaluations of the democraticness of the
Swedish system of government, their approval ratings were very high and
stable (Table 3). The crisis did not produce any significant differences between
the MPs of government and opposition with respect to their support for democ-
racy, their evaluations of the Swedish system of government or their confi-
dence in political parties.
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Table 3: Support for Democracy among MPs (%)
Having a
democratic
political system
Democraticness of
the Swedish system
of government
Confidence in
government
Confidence in
political parties
2007 2013 D 2007 2013 D 2007 2013 D 2007 2013 D
Opposition
Government
100
100
100
100
0
0
98
100
100
100
0
0
21
100
26
100
-5
0
94
93
91
92
3
1
Difference 0          0 -2 0 79***    76*** 1 1
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament Surveys 2007 and 2013.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Indicators used for analysis:
Support for the idea of democracy (“Having a democratic system”): “Very good” and “fairly
good” coded as 1, “fairly bad” and “very bad” as 0.
Evaluation of the democraticness of the Swedish system of government: 1 ‘not at all demo-
cratic’ to 10 ‘completely democratic’. Scores between 1 and 5 coded as 0, scores between 6
and 10 as 1.
Confidence in government and political parties: “A great deal of confidence” and “quite a lot
of confidence” coded as 1, “not much of confidence” and “no confidence at all” as 0.
Yet, the MPs’ confidence in government differed considerably depending on
their party affiliation. MPs of the parties supporting the government expressed
great confidence in the government, while the MPs of the opposition parties
showed much less confidence, without much change between 2007 and 2013.
Only approximately one fifth of the MPs belonging to the opposition showed
confidence in the government.
Even though the opposition did not express much confidence in the govern-
ment, there could still be a common understanding of the crisis, its causes and
its impact. In the following, we will therefore take a closer look at the Swedish
MPs’ evaluations of different aspects of the crisis.
To begin with, let us see how MPs estimated the effect of the crisis on Swe-
den’s economy, and if there were any differences between the government and
the opposition. Respondents were asked two different questions about the cur-
rent state of the economy and the impact of the economic crisis. The left col-
umn in Table 4 shows the MPs’ evaluations of the current state of the Swedish
economy. MPs belonging to the parties in government evaluated the economy
in Sweden as quite good (mean 6.7) on a 10-point scale from “very bad” (1) to
“very good” (10), while MPs of the opposition parties were less impressed
(mean 5.4). The respondents were also asked about their expectation for the
economic development over the coming twelve months. Again, few of the MPs
of the parties in government assessed that the economic situation would get
worse (6 percent). The MPs of the opposition, on the other side, were much
more pessimistic. Almost half of them assessed that things will get worse over
the next 12 months (49 percent). When asked if the economy was in worse
shape now than twelve months before, 61 percent of the MPs of the opposition
parties agreed. Again, those of the parties in government drew a rosier picture.
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Only 17 percent assessed that the economy was worse off now. To sum up, the
MPs were polarized in their assessments of the state of the economy and of the
economic development. This confirms that voters were confronted with diverg-
ing assessments of the economic situation by the major political actors and not
with a concurrent evaluation of the crisis.
Table 4: Swedish MPs’ Assessments of the Economic Crisis
Assessment of the
current state of the
economy
Expectation that the
economic situation will
get worse in the
coming twelve months
Evaluation of the
state of the economy
as worse than twelve
months before
Opposition
Government
5.4
6.7
49
6
61
17
Difference -1.3*** 43*** 34***
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament Survey 2013.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: With statistical controls for age, education and sex.
The opposition and the government were also divided in their evaluations of
the causes of the economic crisis and the best strategies to cope with it. Opposi-
tional MPs tended to blame neo-liberal policies for the outbreak of the crisis
(mean 7.8), while the members of the governing parties did not see neo-liberal
policies as a major cause (mean 3.2).2 This result does not come as a surprise,
since the majority of the oppositional MPs took a leftist position on economic
issues, while the supporters of the center-right government tended to support a
free market economy. This is another confirmation that the political elites who
shaped the citizens’ perceptions and evaluations of the crisis did not hold a
united position on economic policies. Moreover, MPs from the government and
the opposition did not share the same views regarding the usefulness of nation-
al policies to curb the crisis.3 Members of the opposition assumed that national
policies rated the effectivity of national measures higher (mean 7.3) than those
of the parties in government (mean 6.7). Yet, both camps agreed that the na-
tional efforts could do some good to limit the effects of the crisis.
Since Swedish MPs did agree that national policies could be effective, did
they also agree on what policies should be followed in coping with the crisis?
Well, not really. MPs of the opposition parties were much more inclined to
2  MPs were asked to answer the following question: “To what extent do you think was the
crisis a consequence of neo-liberal policies?” by using a 10-point scale from 1 (did not play
any role) to 10 (were primarily responsible).
3  The question was “Do you think that national policy measures for dealing with the impact
of the global financial and economic crisis can be effective or will they have no effect in
the present situation?”. Again, a 10-point scale was used that ranged from 1 ( totally inef-
fective) to 10 (can contribute to overcoming the crisis),
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spend more money on social welfare programs than MPs belonging to the
parties in government. On the question
Are you personally in favor of strengthening existing or introducing additional
social welfare programs to help those citizens who have been hit hardest by
the financial and economic crisis, or do you believe that it is necessary to cut
back social welfare programs to balance the public budget or to become glob-
ally more competitive?4,
members of the parties in government (mean 5.8) were less convinced that
strengthening the social welfare system was a good thing than those of the
opposition parties (mean 8.5). The government did in fact cut back on the wel-
fare systems (Gordon 2017). Consequently, the polarization between the oppo-
sition and the government was evident in this respect as well (Table 5).
Table 5: Swedish MPs’ Evaluations of Neo-Liberal Policies as a Cause of the
Crisis and Policies to cope with the Crisis (Means)
Neo-liberal policies
caused the crisis
National polices can
overcome the crisis
Strengthen social
welfare programs
Opposition
Government
7.8
3.2
7.3
6.7
8.5
5.8
Difference 4.6*** 0.7* 2.7***
Source: Comparative Members of Parliament Survey 2013.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: With statistical controls for age, education and sex.
To sum up, these results indicate that Swedish political elites were neither
united in assessing the impact of the crisis and its causes, nor in their strategies
for handling it. The opposition was rather critical of the government’s econom-
ic policies. Since Swedish politics was rather polarized during the crisis, cues
provided by the political elites cannot explain why the citizens were over-
whelmingly supportive of the government. One of the reasons for solving this
puzzle might be that voters prefer policies proposed by center-right parties
when an economic crisis occurs (Lindvall 2014). Yet, there is evidence that
points into another direction. Next, I will therefore introduce another economic
crisis that struck Sweden. At that time, things did not go that well for the cen-
ter-right government, nor did voters’ approval of the government improve.
4  Respondents were asked to use a ten-point scale, ranging from 1 (cut back on existing
welfare programs) to 10 (strengthen existing or introduce additional social welfare pro-
grams).
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7. The “Homemade“ Crisis of the 1990s
The crisis at the beginning of 1990s was rooted in structural problems that had
plagued the Swedish economy for many years. Already in the 1970s, Sweden
had faced economic problems. Prices and wages increased faster in Sweden
than in other countries. This constituted a severe problem for a small and ex-
port-dependent country. In order to deal with the problem, the currency was
devalued five times between 1976 and 1982. But in 1982 the Swedish govern-
ment decided against further devaluations. However, quite soon after the last
devaluation in 1982 the production costs for Swedish industrial products were
again higher than in other industrial countries.
On top of this problem, the government needed more money. The welfare
state had expanded during the 1970s, but at the same time the economy had
started to slow down. The government solved the problem by increasing taxes
and by borrowing money. The restrictions for borrowing money were eased in
the so-called November revolution of 1985 by deregulating the credit market, a
novelty in the hitherto highly regulated Swedish economy. This implied that
Swedish banks were allowed to lend money to households and companies
without prior approval by the Swedish central bank. As a consequence, the
Swedish financial market was almost immediately flooded with money. It did
not take long before both the housing and the stock market were overheated.
When Sweden entered the 1990s, the Swedish economy experienced a financial
bubble with a high inflation rate and a fixed exchange rate. When the world
economy slowed down at the beginning of the 1990s, the international financial
markets spotted the Swedish currency as an easy target for speculation. This
was stopped only in 1992 when the Swedish government decided to give up the
fixed exchange rate for the Swedish Krona (Kiander and Vartia 2011).
The Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt acknowledged that “This is a failure,
and it should be described as a failure”. Five of the largest banks were bailed
out or needed new capital from their stockholders in order to survive. The
unemployment rate rose from 3 to 11 percent. The real estate market dropped
by more than 50 percent. The crisis had a severe impact not only on the econ-
omy, but also on the political system (Molander 2000). Governmental commis-
sions were appointed to deal with what was seen as a threat to Swedish democ-
racy (Erlingsson, Kölln and Öhberg 2015).
During both crises, Sweden had the same constellation of parties in govern-
ment. None of these governments were directly responsible for their outbreak,
but they had to cope with them. Yet, voter reactions were different. The center-
right government was pushed out of office in the elections 1994, and the Social
Democratic party came back with flying colors. Its share of the total vote, 45.2
percent, was higher than in the three preceding elections.
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8. Feelings toward the Government and Attribution of
Accountability
It has been suggested in the literature that crises arouse citizens’ emotions
which affects to whom they attribute responsibility for the crisis (Kim and
Cameron 2011). Therefore, it is of interest to ask if the homemade crisis of the
early 1990s and the international crisis of 2008 evoked different emotional
patterns. In the SOM surveys, Swedish citizens are regularly asked to rate their
sympathy for each of the parliamentary parties and the Prime Minster on a
scale from -5 (dislike very much) to +5 (like very much). In order to compare
citizens’ feelings toward the center-right governments for the years 1991 to
1993 and 2006 to 2009, the scores for all parties that participated in govern-
ment were combined.
Table 6 shows the feelings toward the parties in government and prime min-
ster Carl Bildt from 1991 to 1993. It can be seen that the feelings toward the
government and the prime minister turned significantly more negative already
in 1992. The center-right parties were not capable of coping with the economic
problems and eventually lost the 1994 elections. The voters punished the gov-
ernment for its failures.
Table 6: Citizens’ Changed feelings toward Government and Prime Minister
1991-1993
1991 1992 1993
Feelings toward government Reference -0.31*** -0.32***
Feelings toward Prime Minister Reference -0.20* -0.30***
Source: Society, Opinion and Media (SOM) Institute Surveys 1988-2011.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table shows the changes in feelings between 1991, 1992 and 1993 toward the
government and the Prime Minister with 1991 as reference. The results are under statistical
controls for age, education, gender and affiliation with a party in government.
When the crisis broke out in 2008, citizens’ feelings toward the government
became more negative (Table 7). Yet, they declined less in 2008 (-0.12) than
they had in 1992 (-0.31). And, as can also be seen in Table 7, a year later citi-
zens’ feelings were not significantly more negative than they were the year
before the crisis. The government bounced back rather quickly. The prime
minster, Fredrik Reinfeldt, received more negative ratings as well when the
crisis hit Sweden’s economy. However, just one year later Reinfeldt was more
popular than he had been before the crisis. In the elections of 2010, the Con-
servative party with Fredrik Reinfeldt as party leader received its best result
ever in the elections of 2010.
The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 support the presumption that the at-
tribution of responsibility depends on the context of a crisis.
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Table 7: Citizens’ Changed Feelings toward Government and Prime Minister
2007-2009
2007 2008 2009
Feelings toward government Reference -0.12* 0.10
Feelings toward prime minister Reference -0.21** 0.71***
Source: Society, Opinion and Media (SOM) Institute Surveys 1988-2011.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table shows the changes in feelings between 2007, 2008 and 2009 toward the
government and the Prime Minister with 2007 as reference. The results are under statistical
controls for age, education, gender and affiliation with parties in government.
9. Conclusions
In an era of mistrust and populist movements, there are concerns that the dem-
ocratic systems are challenged. Yet, when the economic crisis hit Sweden in
2008, the government gained popularity and was rewarded in the next elec-
tions. This indicates that it is not the crisis itself that hurts the government it is
how the government deals with the crisis. Swedish politicians were ready to
face the economic crisis in 2008. At the time of the crisis, the public debate and
the economic experts were comparatively optimistic about the state of the
public finances as well as of the actions of the government. There was also
clarity of responsibility in the sense that the country had a strong and coherent
majority government. The crisis in 2008 illustrates that Sweden had a strong
economy compared to other countries, and since the government was strong
and coherent it received credit from the voters’ for its successful handling of
the crisis. During the crisis of the 1990s, the situation was very different. The
center-right government had a hard time to convince citizen of it competency to
handle the crisis. This was due to the predominant narrative that the economic
problems were “home-made” and that the country did worse than other coun-
tries. Swedish citizens’ trust in politicians was at an all-time low, and the dem-
ocratic system was challenged by voter dissatisfaction.
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